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Abstract 
Firms often offer a variety of add-on products in addition to their core information goods. How should 
firms offer such add-on products? When should they offer them as a bundle versus à la carte? How does 
competition impact firms’ bundling choice? What is the impact of regulators’ decision to limit add-on 
pricing on consumers’ surplus? Motivated by these questions, we develop an analytical model to examine 
asymmetric firms’ bundling and pricing strategy. We identify the critical role of competition in firm’s 
bundling decision. When there is more competition from the inferior firm, the superior firm has more 
incentive to bundle its add-on, even when the add-on is costly to offer. When the ratio of cost to quality is 
sufficiently low, the superior firm bundles as opposed to the monopoly case wherein the superior firm 
unbundles. We show that consumers are unlikely to be better off when add-on pricing is prohibited by 
regulators. 
Keywords 
add-on bundling, duopoly competition, vertical differentiation, asymmetric firms, information goods 
Introduction 
Firms often offer add-on products or services in addition to their core products. Generally add-on product 
refers to any ancillary or complementary product that is offered in addition to firms’ core product. For 
example, software vendors offer technical support and training in addition to packaged software. 
Telecommunication providers promote additional data plans besides voice calling service. Banks offer 
debit card and overdraft protection in addition to the basic checking service. By definition, the purchase of 
an add-on product is contingent on the purchase of the core product. Our primary focus is on the 
information goods industry, though broadly both core and add-on can be information goods or physical 
goods. 
We observe firms that have asymmetric qualities adopt different add-on bundling strategies across 
industries. While low-quality firms often adopt bundling strategy and charge a bundled price for its core 
and add-on product, high-quality firms generally have different bundling strategies. Some high-quality 
firms unbundle their add-ons while others bundle add-ons. In the following examples, Adobe Systems 
Inc., Amazon Web Services Inc., and SolarWinds are high-quality (superior) firms while Nitro Corp., 
BMC Software Inc, and PRTG are low-quality (inferior) firms1. In the software industry, a high-quality 
software vendor such as Adobe Systems Inc. charges for Adobe Acrobat software (core product) and 
expert-level technical support (add-on product) separately, whereas a lower functionality software vendor 
such as Nitro Corp. offers technical support such as discussion forum and online Q&A with the software 
for a bundled price. Other lower quality vendors such as Foxit Software Inc. also bundle technical support 
                                                             
1 Based on prices and reviews, we classify these firms as high quality vendors and low quality vendors, respectively 
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with their software offering. One can also find such asymmetric bundling strategies in other software 
categories. For example, a superior software vendor such as Amazon Web Services Inc. offers technical 
support separately from their data analytics software, while an inferior software vendor such as BMC 
Software Inc. bundles technical support with their data analytics software. In IT security industry, a low 
quality vendor such as PRTG network monitor offers all-in, no add-ons price for both its core network 
monitoring functions and add-on features such as cluster failure solution and security SSL encryption. In 
this industry, a high quality vendor SolarWinds offers the network performance monitor v11 for one 
bundled price including additional features such as route monitoring and packet analysis. How can we 
explain the different add-on bundling strategies adopted by the superior firms? When should they offer 
such add-on products as a bundle or à la carte? How does competition impact a firm’s pricing decision? 
Addressing these questions will help draw insights on the role of competition in driving firms’ pricing 
strategy, and offer guidance to firms who are looking to optimally bundle add-on products in a 
competitive environment. Prior add-on literature has not completely explained such asymmetric bundling 
strategies for add-on products and this is the primary focus of this study.  
Our second focus is to examine the impact of regulating add-on pricing on consumer surplus. Add-on 
pricing has been widely adopted across different industries and firms benefit from charging additionally 
for their add-on products or services. For example, software vendors make great amount of revenue from 
charging technical support (PWC 2007). Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) reported that in 
2012, banks took in $32 billion in overdraft service up $400 million from the previous year (Touryalai 
2013). Given the hefty revenues generated from various kinds of add-on services, general concerns prevail 
in public and among consumer groups who fear companies are over charging through various add-on 
services. Hence, government and regulators have incentive to regulate the add-on services market to 
protect consumers, sometimes even prohibit the add-on pricing practices. For example, British 
government has banned travel companies and retailers from charging extra fees when consumers use 
their credit cards to pay online (Ensor 2013). Although it seems necessary for government intervention 
and industrial regulation of add-on pricing in some circumstances, it is not clear whether such regulation 
can benefit consumers. In this study, we explicitly examine the implication of prohibiting add-on pricing 
policy on consumer surplus. We provide insights on the impact of well-intentioned regulators’ 
intervention on add-on pricing under different conditions.   
We study these questions by building an analytical model in a duopoly setting wherein competing firms 
have asymmetric qualities for their core and add-ons. We also assume firms have asymmetric marginal 
cost for add-ons. Our model incorporates the heterogeneity in consumers’ taste for quality for both core 
and add-on. While most studies in add-on literature (Ellison 2006, Shulman and Geng 2013) assume 
consumers have discrete taste for qualities, we assume consumers are continuously differentiated in their 
taste for qualities, and consumers’ heterogeneous willingness to pay (WTP) for core and add-on are 
correlated. In addition, whereas prior add-on literature assumes a segment of boundedly rational 
consumers and their main results rely on this segment of consumers, we focus on the case in which all 
consumers are rational and fully informed about prices of core and add-on products. 
Our analysis yields several interesting results. First, we identify the critical role of competition in firm’s 
add-on bundling decision. Specifically, when there is more competition from the inferior firm, the 
superior firm will have a stronger incentive to bundle its add-on, even when the add-on product is costly 
to offer. Second, while in the benchmark case, the monopolistic firm will unbundle the add-on, we show in 
duopoly that the superior firm will bundle its add-on, as long as the ratio of cost to quality is not 
sufficiently high. Third, distinct from prior literature, our results show that consumers’ surplus is never 
higher when regulators prohibit add-on pricing.  
Our findings help researchers and practitioners better understand the competing effects of cost and 
competition on firms’ bundling strategy. One managerial insight is that if competition is weak, the 
superior firm may unbundle to gain revenue from the add-on product. However, if competition is very 
strong, the superior firm may be better off bundling its add-on with the core product to soften 
competition and increase profit. An important policy implication is that government and policy makers 
need more discretion in regulating firms’ practice of add-on pricing, because prohibiting add-on pricing 
may change the market equilibrium and thus lessen price competition, this in turn may reduce the total 
consumer surplus. This result calls for the design of an appropriate policy framework that enhances firms’ 
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profits together with consumer surplus. Finally, our closed-form solution offers guidance to firms looking 
to optimize their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.  
The most closely related research to this study is the add-on literature. The first stream of the add-on 
literature studies the profit and price implications for a monopoly that offers a core and an add-on 
product. Fruchter et al (2010) examines when a monopolistic firm should charge a supplementary fee for 
add-on. They find that it is profit-equivalent for the monopoly to bundle or unbundle the add-on when 
both types of consumers value the add-on similarly, and it is optimal to charge the add-on when only the 
low type of consumers value the add-on. Adachi et al (2011) shows that the monopoly should unbundle 
the add-on when the range of the add-on product valuation exceeds a threshold value. Our monopoly case 
shows that even when the add-on valuation is small, as long as the marginal cost for the add-on is 
positive, then it is optimal for the monopoly to unbundle the add-on.   
Prior research in add-on literature also studies the profit and price implications of add-on pricing by 
incorporating a segment of boundedly rational consumers. Verboven (1999) studies firms’ add-on pricing 
strategy when there is a group of myopic consumers in the market who are unaware of the add-on 
information. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) examines firms’ profitability when facing a segment of 
boundedly rational consumers who did not consider the add-on price, and they generate the profit-
irrelevancy result of add-on prices with the existence of boundedly rational consumers. Our research is 
distinct from this stream of research in that we assume all consumers are fully rational and informed. 
Therefore, our bundling result doesn’t rely on the existence of boundedly rational consumers.  
Another stream of add-on literature examines price and profit implications of add-on pricing in 
duopolistic markets. Ellison (2006) finds the optimal profits for symmetric firms in unbundle case are 
higher than that in the bundle case when there is sufficient asymmetry in price sensitivity between the 
high valuation and low valuation consumers. Shulman and Geng (2013) model horizontally differentiated 
firms and assume discrete segments of consumers in the market. They find the superior firm is better off 
by unbundling add-on when add-on qualities are asymmetric. Our research models vertically 
differentiated firms facing a market of consumers who have continuously heterogeneous valuations for 
core and add-on products. We find that the superior firm will bundle when competition is strong or the 
magnitude of marginal cost of add-on relative to quality is relatively small.  
Our study is broadly related to the stream of literature on mixed bundling (Stigler 1963, Adams and Yellen 
1976, McAfee et al 1989, Reisinger 2006). Our model differs from these bundling research in that the 
realization of add-on is related to core product in a specific manner. That is, add-on product is purchased 
contingent on the purchase of core product. In other words, add-on is only valuable together with core 
product offering. 
Benchmark monopoly case 
The central focus of the paper is to study how quality differentiated firms bundle and price their core and 
add-on product in a duopolistic competition and implications of such add-on pricing. We first start with 
the monopoly case which serves as a benchmark.  
A monopolistic firm offers a core product with quality 
c
q  and an add-on product with quality 
a
q . The 
monopoly can offer core product only, or offer core and add-on as à la carte, or offer core and add-on as a 
bundle. Without loss of generality, we assume 0
c a
q q> > , and 
c
q  is normalized to 1. The monopoly offers 
a core information good which is assumed to have negligible marginal cost and an add-on product which 
has non-negative marginal cost (
a
c ). All qualities and cost are assumed to be exogenous.  
The market consists of a unit mass of consumers who have heterogeneous taste for quality. Consistent 
with prior literature (Bakos et al., 1999, Verboven 1999), we assume consumers’ taste 
parameter ~ [0,1]Uθ . θ  is consumer’s private information, although the distribution for the entire 
consumer population is common knowledge.  
The sequence of the game is that first, the monopoly sets the bundling strategy and the prices, then 
consumers decide whether and which firm to purchase from based on their surplus. If the monopoly 
bundles, then consumers can either buy the bundle or not buy; if the monopoly unbundles, then 
consumers can buy either core product only or both core and add-on or nothing. The consumer’s utility 
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function is U q pθ= − . We allow consumer’s WTP for core product to be positively correlated with her 
WTP for the add-on. For example, consumers who appreciate higher quality of an ERP system are also 
likely to appreciate higher quality of after-sales support. 
Each consumer can buy at most one unit of core and one unit of add-on. Note that by nature of add-on, 
one cannot buy add-on only without buying core first. Examples can be found across industries, i.e. 
software users find no value for technical support without purchasing the software first; consumers 
cannot consume WiFi without purchasing the hotel room first.   
If the monopoly bundles and offers 
B
p , then a consumer buys the bundle if her individual rationality (IR) 
constraint is met: (1 ) 0
B a B
q pθ + − ≥ . The firm’s profit function is ( )(1 )
1
B
B B a
a
p
p c
q
π = − −
+
. If the firm 
unbundles and offers cp  for core product and ap  for add-on, then consumers buy core good if her IR 
constraint is met: 0
c c
pθ − ≥ , or buy both core and add-on if the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint is 
met: (1 )
a a c a a c
q p p pθ θ+ − − ≥ − . The firm’s profit function is ( ) ( )(1 )a aN c c c a a
a a
p p
p p p p c
q q
π = − + + − − . The 
monopoly optimizes the profit functions to get optimal price and profit for each case. Comparing results 
from the two cases, we get the equilibrium for the monopoly. 
LEMMA 1. The monopoly unbundles in equilibrium ( * *B Nπ π< ) when 0ac > . The monopoly bundles 
when 0
a
c = .  
Lemma 1 shows the monopoly unbundles as long as the marginal cost is positive. The unbundling strategy 
serves as a price discriminate mechanism such that only high valuation customers are willing to buy the 
add-on. This result extends prior literature in add-on pricing (Adachi et al. 2011). We now turn to our 
main analysis of duopoly competition, and compare the results with the benchmark case. 
Duopoly case 
The market consists of two competing firms with heterogeneous qualities for their core and add-on 
products. The superior firm (H) offers its core product H
cq  (normalize to 1) and add-on 
H
aq  ( 1
H
aq < ), and 
the inferior firm (L) offers its core product H
cq  and add-on 
H
aq  (
L L
a cq q< ). Typically, valuation of add-on is 
sufficiently smaller than core product, so we assume 1L L Hc a aq q q+ < + , and the sum of the qualities of the 
inferior firm’s core and add-on product is still less than the superior firm’s core quality ( 1L Lc aq q+ < )
2. And 
we assume that both firms have negligible marginal cost for their core products. The superior firm has 
non-negative marginal cost for its add-on product while the inferior firm has negligible marginal cost for 
its add-on. This abstraction is consistent with anecdotal evidence. For example, Adobe Systems Inc. offers 
digital document editing and sharing software, i.e. Adobe Acrobat series, and associated expert support 
over phone and on site3. Adobe incurs significant cost for providing labor and transportation for its expert 
support. So Adobe has non-negligible marginal cost for its add-on service. In contrast, Adobe’s 
competitors such as Nitro Corp. offers lower quality versions of pdf editing software, i.e. Nitro Pro, with 
technical support via online community and Q&A. Since this technical support is provided online and 
does not include on-site support, this add-on service has negligible marginal cost.  
Consumers 
The market consists of one unit mass of consumers. Consumers’ taste θ  follows the same assumption as 
in the monopoly case. Distinct from add-on literature (Shulman and Geng 2013, Ellison 2006), we allow 
all consumers to be rational. That is, they know full information of prices and qualities of both firms. 
                                                             
2 The equilibrium result remains the same when 1L L
c a
q q+ > , as long as 1
L L H
c a a
q q q+ < + .  
3http://www.adobe.com/support/expert_support/product.html 
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Consumers can buy core product only or both core and add-on from either firm or buy nothing. A 
consumer’s generic utility function is the same as in the monopoly setting.  
We model a two-stage game. In stage 1, firms simultaneously choose bundling strategy and 
correspondingly, offer either bundle price or separate prices for its core and add-on to maximize their 
profits. In stage 2, consumers decide whether and which firm to purchase to maximize their utility. 
Analysis and results 
Each firm needs to decide whether to bundle or unbundle its core and add-on product. Hence, there are 
four cases that may occur: both firms bundle (BB case), the superior firm (H) unbundles and the inferior 
firm (L) bundles (NB case), firm H bundles and firm L unbundles (BN case), and both firms unbundle 
(NN case). Each firm compares the optimal profit derived from its bundling strategy, given the rival’s 
bundling strategy.  
Both firms bundle 
When both firms bundle, a consumer buys firm L’s bundle if his individual rationality (IR) constraint is 
met, i.e. ( ) 0L L L Lc a BBq q pθ + − ≥ , and buys firm H’s bundle if his incentive compatibility (IC) constraint is 
met, i.e. (1 ) ( )H H H H L L La BB c a BBq p q q pθ θ+ − ≥ + −  
 
Figure 1: demand for firm L’s bundle ( L
BBD ) and for firm H’s bundle (
H
BBD )  
The indifferent consumer valuation points ( H
BBθ , 
L
BBθ  ) can be derived by solving the above two equations. 
Firm L’s demand is H L
BB BBθ θ−  and Firm H’s demand is 1
H
BBθ− . Accordingly, firm H’s profit 
is ( )(1 )H H H HBB BB a BBp cπ θ= − − and firm L’s profit is ( )
L L H L
BB BB BB BBpπ θ θ= − . We derive the optimal prices in this 
subgame by taking the first order condition for the profit functions and solving them simultaneously 
( *H
BBp , 
*L
BBp ), and then we get the optimal profit for each firm (
*H
BBπ , 
*L
BBπ ). The constraints for this case to be 
feasible is: * *0 1L HBB BBθ θ< < < .  The complete expressions for prices and profits are available upon request. 
The superior firm unbundles and the inferior firm bundles 
When the superior firm unbundles and the inferior firm bundles (NB case), a consumer buys firm L’s 
bundle if ( ) 0L L L LNB c a NBq q pθ + − ≥ , and buys firm H’s core product if ( )
Hc Hc Hc L L L
NB c a NBp q q pθ θ− ≥ + − , and buys 
firm H’s both core and add-on product if (1 )Ha H Hc Ha Ha Hca NB NB NBq p p pθ θ+ − − ≥ − .   
 
Figure 2: demand for firm L’s bundle ( L
NBD ), for firm H’s core good (
Hc
NBD ), and for firm H’s 
core and add-on ( H
NBD  )  
Inferior firm’s profit function is ( )L L Hc LNB NB NB NBpπ θ θ= − , and superior firm’s profit function is 
( ) ( )(1 )H Hc Ha Hc Hc Ha H HaNB NB NB NB NB NB a NBp p p cπ θ θ θ= − + + − − . We use the same approach as §4.1 to derive the optimal 
price and profit for each firm. The detailed expressions are available upon request. 
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The analysis for the case that the superior firm bundles and the inferior firm unbundles (BN case) and for 
the case that both firms unbundle (NN case) follow a similar manner as §4.1 and §4.2. We omit it here for 
lack of space. After deriving the optimal demand and profit for these two cases, we find that when the 
inferior firm unbundles, all consumers who buy the inferior firm’s core product also buy its add-on. The 
optimal demand for the inferior firm’s core product is zero. Therefore, unbundling is not optimal for the 
inferior firm. We will focus on BB and NB cases to derive the equilibrium. 
Equilibrium solution of bundling cases 
The equilibrium solution of bundling cases is reported in the following lemma: 
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, both firms bundle (BB) when H
a
c q≤ % . The superior firm unbundles and the 
inferior firm bundles (NB) when H
a
c q> % .  
Lemma 2 shows duopolistic firms’ bundling strategies in equilibrium. When the marginal cost of the 
superior firm’s add-on is relatively small, both firms bundle; otherwise, the superior firm unbundles and 
the inferior firm bundles. The threshold ( q% ) is a function of the inferior firm’s bundle quality, and is 
increasing with the inferior firm’s bundle quality.  
PROPOSITION 1. Equilibrium cases. Whereas the superior firm unbundles in the monopoly if 
0Hac > , in duopoly competition, the superior firm bundles if (0,  )
H
ac q∈ % , and unbundles if 
H
ac q> % . The 
inferior firm bundles in both monopoly and duopoly.  
Proposition 1 highlights the changes in the superior firm’s bundling strategy when an inferior firm 
competes in the market. In the monopoly, the superior firm will always unbundle as long as the marginal 
cost of add-on is positive. In contrast, in duopoly, the superior firm bundles when the marginal cost of 
add-on is positive, as long as it is not sufficiently large. The intuition is the following. When quality-based 
competition exists and marginal cost of add-on is not sufficiently large, firm H will bundle to make their 
bundle quality more differentiated with its competitor, and thus soften competition and obtain a higher 
profit. When marginal cost of add-on is above the threshold, it will become more costly for firm H to serve 
the add-on, thus firm H only serves add-on to higher valuation consumers, and serve core product only to 
relatively low valuation consumers. The increased pressure of add-on cost dominates competition effect, 
thus superior firm unbundles to avoid serving costly add-on to relatively low valuation consumers. 
Basically, in duopoly case superior firm will decide its bundling strategy by balancing competition effect 
and marginal cost effect.   
Note that if the inferior firm’s bundle quality is large and close to the superior firm’s core quality, then 
H
aq q>% , this implies that the superior firm will bundle, even if marginal cost is high. This is because the 
strong competition will force superior firm to bundle to maximally differentiate with the rival’s bundle. 
Even if marginal cost of add-on is high, competition effect will still outweigh the cost effect, so the 
superior firm bundles in equilibrium.  
The above analysis helps explain the phenomena that more high quality hotels which previously charge 
separately for their Internet service now start to offer their WiFi service for free (Seminara 2012) to deal 
with the increased competition from low-end hotels which have already bundled their complementary 
WiFi service in room offering.  
Proposition 1 contributes to the add-on literature. It is the first result to identify the difference of the 
superior firm’s bundling strategies in duopoly versus in monopoly, and highlight the competition effect 
and cost effect for the superior firm’s bundling decision. While Shulman and Geng (2013) find that in the 
case where firms have asymmetric quality for both core and add-on, the superior firm will unbundle and 
the inferior firm will bundle if its add-on quality is significantly lower than the superior firm’s add-on 
quality, we find that the superior firm will either bundle or unbundle, depending on the magnitude of 
marginal cost of add-on relative to qualities, and the inferior firm will bundle, even when there is no 
significant asymmetry in add-on quality. In the case where there is symmetric add-on quality, whereas 
Shulman and Geng (2013) find both firms’ profits are irrelevant of their bundling decisions, our results 
show that the inferior firm’s profit is irrelevant of its bundling strategy while the superior firm’s profit is 
depending on its bundling decision. One underlying reason for the differences of results is that the 
asymmetric add-on bundling strategy in Shulman and Geng (2013) is derived based on two exogenous 
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consumer segments, the core segment of consumers who has no value for add-on and the knowledgeable 
segment of consumers who has value for add-on (thus in equilibrium, knowledgeable segment always 
buys add-on while core segment never buys add-on). On the contrary, our results of asymmetric bundling 
strategy does not require exogenous segments of core and knowledgeable consumers but is based on 
consumers’ heterogeneous valuation for qualities.  
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that all consumers will buy both core and add-on products in 
equilibrium when there is no information asymmetry. In contrast, we show that with information 
symmetry, consumers buy either core product only or both core and add-on, based on their heterogonous 
WTP. 
Implications of regulating add-on pricing 
We examine the implications of industrial regulations and government intervention aimed to limit the 
ability to charge for add-on. In order to examine the impact of regulating add-on pricing on consumers, 
we compare consumer surplus between the scenarios in which firms are allowed to use add-on pricing 
and the scenario in which add-on pricing is prohibited.   
PROPOSITION 2. The prohibition of add-on pricing reduces consumer surplus when 
H
a
c q> % ; the 
prohibition of add-on pricing has no impact on consumer surplus when 
H
a
c q≤ % .  
Proposition 2 highlights the negative impact of regulating add-on pricing on consumer surplus. That is, 
when marginal cost for superior firm’s add-on is sufficiently large, consumer surplus is lower when add-
on pricing is prohibited than the case when it is allowed. The intuition is as follows. If 
H
a
c q> % , then when 
add-on pricing is allowed, the optimal strategy for the superior firm is to unbundle; when add-on pricing 
is prohibited, superior firm has to bundle the costly add-on with its core product, and it is a suboptimal 
strategy. As a result, superior firm’s bundle price is higher than the sum of prices for core and add-on, and 
inferior firm’s bundle price is higher than its bundle price had if add-on pricing were allowed. Therefore, 
consumers’ WTP for each firm’s core and add-on remains the same but each firm’s price is higher, total 
demand is lower, so consumers’ surplus is less than the case when add-on pricing was allowed.  
Our add-on pricing implication for consumer surplus is in contrast with the result in Ellison (2006), 
which shows the opposite result (i.e. consumer surplus is lower when add-on pricing is allowed than that 
without add-on pricing). The result in Ellison (2006) is driven by the fact that both firms price 
discriminate when add-on pricing is allowed, i.e. both firms unbundle and each firm offers two quality 
versions of products. Hence, in equilibrium consumers who have low valuation buy low quality product 
and high valuation consumers buy high quality product. More consumer surplus has been extracted than 
the case where all consumers buy high quality product (when add-on pricing is prohibited). In our study, 
the result of consumer surplus comparison is driven by firms’ asymmetric quality and cost and 
competition effect. If superior firm’s add-on is sufficiently large, then when add-on pricing is allowed, the 
superior firm unbundles and the inferior firm bundles, inferior firm’s bundle quality is closer to superior 
firm’s core quality. Each firm has to lower its price to compete with each other. When add-on pricing is 
prohibited, superior firm is forced to bundle its add-on, and the two firms are more quality differentiated, 
hence, competition is softened and each firm increases price for its core and add-on. Hence, consumer 
surplus is lower than the case if add-on pricing is allowed.  
Discussion and conclusion 
This study extends prior add-on literature in the following ways. First, we explicitly examine the 
asymmetric firms’ add-on bundling and pricing problem when consumers are continuously differentiated 
in their taste for core and add-on products. Second, our model accommodates the asymmetry in qualities 
of core and add-on products between the competing firms and examines the impact of the quality 
asymmetry on competition and firms’ pricing strategy. Third, we explicitly study the impact of public 
policy (i.e. industrial regulation and government intervention to prohibit the add-on pricing practice) on 
consumer surplus. We find the contrasting result with prior literature and explain the intuition for the 
differences.  
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Specifically, prior literature (e.g. Shulman and Geng 2013) shows the superior firm unbundles and the 
inferior firm bundles if there is significant asymmetry in add-on quality between the two firms. Our result 
shows that the superior firm will either bundle or unbundle, depending on the intensity of competition 
and the magnitude of marginal cost of add-on relative to quality. Our asymmetric bundling result in 
equilibrium helps explain the mixed phenomenon across industries that inferior firm bundles add-on 
while superior firm either bundles or unbundles their add-ons. Second, while prior research suggests the 
low-quality firm is more likely to price discriminate than the high-quality firm in the form of rebates 
(Dogan et al. 2010), we show the opposite result where high-quality firms rather than low-quality firm will 
price discriminate for their core and add-on products under asymmetric add-on marginal costs. We 
identify the competition effect to firms. Distinct from the benchmark case where the monopoly 
unbundles, in duopoly case, the superior firm bundles as long as the ratio of marginal cost to quality is not 
sufficiently large. Our results draw important policy implications of regulating firms’ add-on pricing. We 
find that the well-intentioned government intervention on prohibiting add-on pricing may actually reduce 
consumer surplus, this may call for a more appropriate policy framework to account for the joint effect of 
regulation and market competition on consumer surplus.  
This study can be extended in the following ways. First, an important extension related to the policy 
implication of limiting add-on pricing is to examine how government regulatory policy on prohibiting 
add-on pricing impacts firms’ profitability and social welfare. And we will compare our findings with prior 
add-on literature on the policy implication, and provide more insights for government regulation on add-
on pricing. Secondly, while we focus on analyzing the add-on bundling strategy for competing firms and 
its implications with fully informed consumers, it is interesting to see how the bundling and pricing 
strategy will change when there is a segment of uninformed or myopic consumers in the market. In 
addition, in current model we have assumed consumers’ valuation on add-on product is positively 
correlated with core product. It is interesting to examine the case where consumers have independent 
valuations on core and add-on products, can compare with the current case to see how firms’ competition 
and pricing strategy will change. 
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Appendix: Proofs for Propositions and Lemmas 
 
Proof for Lemma 1: 
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Proof for Lemma 2: 
Following the approach described in §5.1 and §5.2, we get *H
NBπ  and 
*H
BBπ , then   
2
* *
2
2
2
( ) 4(1 )
4 (4 )
(2(1 )(1 ) (2 2 ))
    
(1 )(4 4 )
H H L L
H H a a c a
NB BB H L L
a c a
H H L L H H L L
a a c a a a c a
H L L H L L
a c a a c a
q c q q
q q q
q q q q c q q q
q q q q q q
π π
− − −
− = + −
− −
+ + − − − + − −
+ − − + − −
Solving it for H
ac , we get two roots, one positive and 
one negative, the positive root we denote as q%  (see below), and the intercept is negative. Hence, if  
(0,  )Hac q∈ % ,  
* *H H
NB BBπ π< ; if 
H
ac q> % , 
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NB BBπ π> .                                                                                                           • 
Proof for Proposition 1: 
Compare the results in Lemma 1 and 2, we get the difference in bundling strategy in the monopoly and in 
duopoly.                                                                                •   
Proof for Proposition 2: 
We denote consumer surplus as *CS  when add-on pricing is allowed and consumer surplus as 
*
CS  when 
add-on pricing is prohibited.  If H
ac q> % , the optimal strategy for the superior firm is to unbundle. When 
add-on pricing is allowed, we got 
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we get 
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CS . When add-on pricing is allowed, we get 
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, solving it 
for
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ac , the intercept can be shown is negative.  
 
 
